From Ahimsa to Agni: India’s Journey to a Missile and Air Defence Power
From thinking we don't need an Army to becoming an exporter of security, stability, and cutting-edge defence solutions
India’s rise from an under-defended young nation to a burgeoning missile and air defence power is a story of dramatic transformation. In 1947, the country’s leadership scarcely saw the need for a robust military – Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru even mused that “we don’t need a defence policy… scrap the army – the police are good enough”. But through the trials of wars, technological embargoes, and a changing strategic environment, India crafted a formidable arsenal of missiles and air defence systems by 2025. Today, that arsenal ranges from nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to state-of-the-art anti-missile shields, and it is set to grow even more sophisticated by 2035. This article provides a comprehensive walkthrough of India’s missile and air defence capabilities – their origin, current status, planned upgrades, and how they stack up against the USA, China, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia in capability, cost, and battle readiness. It also explores how India’s outlook on defence has shifted, especially after Operation Sindoor and why its credible deterrent – including a stealthy fleet of nuclear submarines – makes the prospect of any nuclear strike on India extremely unlikely.
From Neglect to Ambition: A Historical Trajectory
Nehru’s Era – Minimal Defence: In the first years of independence, India’s leadership gave low priority to military technology. Nehru’s idealism and focus on non-violence meant that defence spending was curtailed. The painful wake-up call came with the 1962 Sino-Indian War, where India suffered for its lack of modern weaponry. Through the 1960s and ’70s, as wars with Pakistan and the nuclear spectre loomed, India slowly began investing in defence R&D. The establishment of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in 1958 and successes in space launch vehicles indicated latent potential in rocketry.
IGMDP and the Missile Man: A turning point was the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) launched in 1983 under Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s leadership. This ambitious initiative, blessed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Defence Minister R. Venkataraman, sought to develop a family of indigenous missiles simultaneously – a bold move when India was still under technology sanctions. The five key projects of IGMDP were the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile, Agni technology demonstrator (which later became a long-range ballistic missile series), Akash medium-range surface-to-air missile, Trishul short-range SAM, and Nag anti-tank missile. Despite hurdles, like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) nations denying critical technology, India persevered by developing components in-house. By the program’s conclusion in 2008, most of these missiles had been successfully developed and inducted, earning Kalam the moniker “Missile Man of India”.
Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Posture: Parallel to missile development, India’s nuclear program advanced (peaceful nuclear test in 1974 and weapon tests in 1998). With nuclear arms came the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence – i.e. having enough capability to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation, thus deterring any nuclear aggression. India built a triad: aircraft-delivered bombs, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. This triad philosophy would later underscore why a nuclear strike on India is extremely unlikely – any aggressor knows India can strike back even if heavily hit, especially with nuclear submarines lurking invisibly at sea.
Accelerating into the 21st Century: Through the 1990s and 2000s, India’s missile arsenal grew rapidly. Each success bred confidence – Prithvi was test-fired in 1988 and inducted in the ’90s as India’s first deployed ballistic missile. The Agni series evolved from a tech demo into operational intermediate-range missiles. By the 2010s, India tested the 5,000+ km Agni-V, entering the ICBM club, and validated submarine-launched missiles for its Arihant nuclear submarine. On the defensive side, the Akash SAM was eventually perfected and inducted (after long development), and critical new programs like ballistic missile defence were initiated. With economic growth, India also imported advanced systems to fill gaps – e.g. Israeli and Russian SAM systems – while simultaneously pushing indigenous projects. This dual approach has borne fruit: by the mid-2020s, India fields an array of home-grown missiles and shields that is impressively broad and increasingly proven.
The Offensive Arsenal: India’s Missiles in 2025
India’s missile arsenal spans every class: ballistic missiles of various ranges (for nuclear deterrence and tactical use), cruise missiles (for precision strikes), anti-tank and anti-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and more. Below, we break down the major categories, their capabilities, indigenous content, and how they compare with similar systems of other leading nations.
Ballistic Missiles – From Prithvi to Agni
Prithvi Series: The Prithvi was India’s first indigenously developed ballistic missile, a short-range surface-to-surface missile (150–350 km range) developed under IGMDP. It uses liquid fuel and various high-explosive or nuclear warheads. Prithvi-I entered service with the Army in the 1990s; later variants extended range or adapted for Air Force (Prithvi-II) and Navy (Dhanush, a ship-launched variant). While relatively short-legged and of older vintage, Prithvi gave India a basic battlefield missile capability akin to Scud-type missiles. Pakistan, by comparison, developed its own short-range missiles like Hatf/Nasr and Ghaznavi; these are largely solid-fueled and road-mobile, whereas Prithvi’s liquid fuel is more time-consuming to prepare. Capability: Prithvi is accurate for its class (circular error probable ~50m) and can deliver nuclear payloads, but its short range limits it to regional tactical targets. Cost: Being indigenous, Prithvi was cost-effective, though the maintenance of liquid-fueled systems is cumbersome. Battle-provenness: Thankfully never used in war, Prithvi was regularly test-fired and even used to launch satellites in suborbital missions; it’s considered reliable, but less advanced than newer solid-fueled missiles. Today, Prithvi is being supplemented or replaced by more modern solid Prahaar/Pralay missiles. (Notably, the Army tested a new 150-km Prahaar quasi-ballistic missile, and in late 2021, DRDO tested Pralay, a 350–500 km solid tactical missile with manoeuvrable trajectory – akin to Russia’s Iskander or China’s DF-12. Pralay, with its high accuracy and non-nuclear payload, can devastate high-value targets in a conventional conflict, giving India a conventional deterrent against Pakistan’s missile force.)
Agni Series: Named after the Sanskrit word for fire, Agni ballistic missiles are the bedrock of India’s strategic deterrent. The Agni program began as a technology demonstrator for re-entry vehicles under IGMDP, but has blossomed into a family of nuclear-capable missiles of increasing range. Key Agni variants:
Agni-I & II: Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) inducted in the early 2000s. Agni-I (~700–1,200 km) and Agni-II (~2,000 km) are road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles that can cover Pakistan entirely and reach parts of western China. They were developed and inducted by the Army as deterrents against regional threats. Comparison: Pakistan’s roughly equivalent MRBMs are the Shaheen series – e.g. Shaheen-II (1,500+ km) and Shaheen-III (~2,750 km) – which were developed with Chinese assistance. While Agni-II and Shaheen-II are similar in range and both are two-stage solid fuel designs, capability-wise, Agni’s guidance and payload (up to 1 ton nuclear warhead) give it a powerful punch. Cost: Being indigenous, Agni-I/II avoid import costs; Pakistani missiles, based on Chinese tech, might be cheaper through foreign aid, but not necessarily more capable. Battle Provenness: Neither has seen combat (thankfully), but both are routinely tested. India’s Agni-II had some test glitches in early trials but is now considered mature; Pakistan’s Shaheen has been test-fired successfully as well. Neither country’s MRBMs have the extensive test pedigree of US or Russian systems, but they are credible regional deterrents.
Agni-III & IV: These intermediate-range missiles (Agni-III ~3,000+ km; Agni-IV ~4,000 km) were developed to extend India’s reach deeper into Asia. Agni-III, tested in 2006, is a hefty two-stage missile with a 1.5-ton payload – it can carry a large nuclear warhead to anywhere in Pakistan or most of China. Agni-IV is a more refined, lighter missile (with composite stages and improved accuracy) that can reach about 4,000 km. It was tested around 2011. They give India the capability to target high-value strategic targets in an adversary’s interior. China’s nearest analogue might be missiles like the DF-21 (though that is ~1,800 km) or DF-26 (~4,000 km). Capability: Agni-III/IV have advanced inertial navigation for accuracy (CEP possibly around 40m for Agni-IV) and can be launched from rail or road launchers. Comparison: Versus Chinese missiles, India’s Agnis are fewer in number and not as long-ranged as China’s top missiles. However, in South Asia, no other country except China has anything comparable. Pakistan’s max range missile, Shaheen-III (~2,750 km), falls short of Agni-III’s reach. The Agni-III/IV thus give India an edge over Pakistan in range and throw-weight, while narrowing the gap with China. Battle readiness: Both have been tested multiple times successfully, but neither has been used in anger. Their “provenness” is confined to test range data, which is true of all long-range missiles globally (no country has “battle-proven” an intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile in war, for obvious reasons).
Agni-V Agni-V: The crown jewel is the Agni-V, India’s first ICBM-class missile. At ~5,000–5,500 km range, Agni-V can reach all of Asia, and parts of Europe and Africa from India. It’s a three-stage solid-fueled missile, road-mobile in a canister (a technology leap that improves reaction time and storage). Agni-V was first tested in 2012 and has had a series of successful flights since, including one in December 2022 and a user trial in 2023. Capabilities: Apart from range, Agni-V is notable for its modern guidance and the potential to carry MIRVs (Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles). In 2024, India released images of an Agni-V carrying what appeared to be MIRV payloads (multiple warheads) in a test dubbed “Mission Divyastra”. If MIRV tech is perfected, a single Agni-V could deliver 2–3 nuclear warheads to different targets, dramatically increasing deterrence value. Global standing: Agni-V places India among a small club of countries (US, Russia, China, France, UK) with operational near-ICBMs. The US and Russia still outmatch everyone in ICBMs – e.g. the US Minuteman-III and Russian Topol-M have longer reach (~8,000–12,000 km) and carry multiple warheads routinely. China’s DF-41 ICBM (estimated 12,000+ km, MIRV-capable) also exceeds Agni-V in range and payload. But Agni-V is comparable to China’s earlier DF-31A ICBM (11,000 km with 1 warhead) in technology, and to France’s M51 SLBM in range. Cost: Indigenous development made Agni-V relatively affordable; each unit’s cost is not public, but likely far less than the development cost of Western ICBMs decades ago. Battle readiness: Agni-V has not seen combat (no ICBM has), but it is inducted in limited numbers and held by India’s Strategic Forces. Its reliability so far is high, with all tests achieving their objectives. Observers note that India deliberately tests Agni-V in a restrained manner (no full range flamboyant shots to avoid geopolitical provocations), but in a real scenario, it provides a dependable deterrent strike option. Importantly, Agni-V’s deployment has altered China’s threat calculus, as India can now credibly target major Chinese cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. This levels the deterrence equation, since China for long could target all of India.
Agni-VI (Speculative): Though not officially confirmed, India is believed to be working on a next-gen ICBM (sometimes dubbed Agni-VI) with longer reach (perhaps 6,000–8,000 km) and heavier MIRV payload. There are hints that Agni-VI might be canisterized and potentially even submarine-capable in the far future, but details remain secret. By 2035, if Agni-VI materialises, India could achieve true parity in reach with the mid-tier nuclear superpowers and deploy missiles with 3–5 warheads each. That would put India’s strategic forces closer in capacity to China’s (which is rapidly expanding its ICBM arsenal), though still far behind the sheer numbers fielded by the US and Russia (who each have 400–500 ICBMs, many with MIRVs). India, however, does not seek numerical parity; a credible minimum deterrent is enough, and Agni-V/VIs ensure that.
K Family – Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles: A major leap in indigenous capability is the K-series of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), developed for India’s nuclear submarines. The INS Arihant class SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) form the third leg of India’s triad, guaranteeing a second-strike capability. Key missiles here:
K-15 (Sagarika): A 10.4 m, two-stage solid SLBM with ~750 km range and 1-ton payload. It was secretly test-fired multiple times and first revealed in 2008. The Arihant sub can carry 12 K-15 missiles. Though 750 km is relatively short, it suffices for covering Pakistan or reaching the coastal cities of an adversary if the sub gets closer. K-15 gives India assured retaliation against regional threats. Pakistan has no sea-based nuclear missiles (its submarine-launched Babur cruise missile project is still in development), so India has a clear edge at sea.
K-4: A much larger SLBM (~3,500 km range) developed to arm the later Arihant-class boats. K-4 is about 12m long, carrying a 1+ ton warhead, and can strike deep inland targets from the northern Indian Ocean – for example, covering all of Pakistan and most of China’s key cities from waters near India. The INS Arighat (second SSBN, commissioned August 2024) and follow-on boats are designed to carry 4 K-4 missiles each (in place of many K-15s, since K-4’s diameter is larger). Status: K-4 has been tested successfully multiple times (first in 2016, most recently in 2020, reportedly). It is likely now operational on India’s second and third SSBNs. Global context: With ~3,500 km range, K-4 is roughly comparable to older Chinese JL-2 SLBMs (which have ~7,000 km but China’s new JL-3 goes much farther). Western SLBMs (Trident-II, etc.) still far outrange it (12,000 km). But K-4 significantly extends India’s nuclear reach from stealthy platforms, and no other nation in the Indian Ocean region has anything similar.
Future SLBMs (K-5, K-6): Plans exist for longer-range SLBMs of 5,000 km and 8,000+ km to equip a new class of bigger submarines (S5 class). India is expected to build four Arihant-class SSBNs in total by around 2030, and then shift to the S5 class (~13,000-ton subs that can carry perhaps 8–12 long-range missiles each). The K-5 (likely ~5,000 km) and K-6 (~6-8,000 km, possibly MIRVed) are speculative but align with India’s goal of a credible deterrent against China’s eastern seaboard without leaving the Indian Ocean. By 2035, India could have a couple of S5 subs in addition to the Arihants, armed with K-5/6 missiles, allowing true oceanic deterrence patrols akin to the US Ohio-class or Russian Borei-class subs (albeit with fewer missiles). Deterrence effect: These developments mean that even if (hypothetically) an adversary struck India’s land-based nukes, India’s SSBNs at sea would survive to unleash retaliation – a classic assured second strike. This submarine-based insurance is a key reason no country is likely to ever fire a nuclear missile at India. Any rational adversary knows that India’s response would be devastating, delivered from undetected submarines if not from land. For instance, an SSBN lurking in the Bay of Bengal could launch a salvo of K-4 or K-5 missiles at an aggressor’s cities. The danger of such retaliation has a powerful deterrent effect, making a first strike on India extremely unattractive. As of 2025, India has two SSBNs (INS Arihant and Arighat), with two more under construction. By the early 2030s, India plans to operate four SSBNs, and in subsequent years, field the larger S5 subs – perhaps aiming for 6-8 boats by the 2040s. This would give India one of the world’s most survivable nuclear arsenals after the US, Russia, and China, creating a robust deterrent shield.
Comparative Rating (Ballistic Missiles): In terms of capability, India’s ballistic missiles now cover ranges from 150 km to >5,000 km with mostly solid-fuel, mobile systems, on par with China’s older generation and far beyond Pakistan’s (which max out at ~2,700 km). The introduction of MIRV on Agni-V (and eventually Agni-VI) will put India closer to the big nuclear powers’ tech. However, the US and Russia still lead in sheer range and MIRV loading (they deploy missiles carrying 10 warheads across oceans). China is catching up fast, reportedly building 300+ new ICBM silos and MIRVed warheads – a scale India is unlikely to match due to its “minimum deterrence” doctrine. Cost-wise, Indian missiles benefit from indigenous production – an Agni or Prithvi costs only a few million dollars, cheaper than the high-end US interceptors or strategic missiles developed in the Cold War era. Indian missiles are built for frugality and road/rail mobility, whereas Western ones were built for silo or sub launch with more expensive components. This cost-effectiveness is partly why countries like Brazil and others have shown interest in Indian missile technology (for example, Brazil in 2025 expressed interest in India’s tactical missile systems).
In battle-provenness, no strategic ballistic missile has ever been used in conflict by any of these nations (aside from tests). However, short-range ballistic missiles have seen some use (Scuds in the Gulf War, North Korean missiles as tests, etc.). Among India’s peers: US and Soviet/Russian ballistic missiles have decades of testing and refinement (and space launch crossover), arguably making them very reliable; China has fewer real-use data but extensive test programs; Pakistan’s missiles have mostly Chinese origins with limited test series. India’s missiles have achieved a high success rate in developmental tests, and notably, during the 2025 Operation Sindoor, India did not need to use Agni or Prithvi missiles (the conflict remained below the nuclear threshold). But the very existence of these missiles provided the strategic backdrop that prevented further escalation – a success of deterrence.
In summary, as of 2025, India’s ballistic missile arsenal is among the world’s most comprehensive outside the P5 nations. It gives India an assured retaliation capability (hence deterring nuclear war), and also supplies conventional options (like Pralay) for precision strikes. The trajectory ahead (to 2035) suggests even greater range and sophistication – a fully mature triad with MIRVed ICBMs on land and advanced SLBMs at sea, putting India in a league just behind the US, Russia, and China in ballistic missile proficiency.
Cruise Missiles – The BrahMos and Beyond
If Agni is India’s roar in the strategic realm, BrahMos is its lightning strike on the tactical battlefield. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, developed jointly with Russia, is arguably India’s most famous missile – and one of its most exportable. But India’s cruise missile portfolio doesn’t end there; it includes indigenous long-range cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, and air-launched weapons.
BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile
The BrahMos (named after India’s Brahmaputra and Russia’s Moskva rivers) is an 8.4-meter, two-stage missile that flies at Mach 2.8–3.0 and can carry a 200–300 kg warhead. It is a multi-platform weapon: it can be launched from land-based mobile launchers, warship vertical launchers, aircraft, and even submarines. BrahMos has been in service since 2007 and equips the Indian Army (ground-launched batteries), Navy (on many frontline frigates and destroyers as an anti-ship and land-attack missile), and Air Force (a special air-launched variant). Initially, its range was capped at ~290 km due to MTCR restrictions, but after India joined MTCR in 2016, the range has been extended. By 2024, BrahMos missiles with 800 km range were ordered by the Indian Navy, effectively nearly tripling their reach. This makes BrahMos a long-range standoff weapon ideal for taking out high-value targets deep in enemy territory or at sea.
Variants: The base BrahMos (~3 ton launch weight) is deployed in land and ship roles. The BrahMos-A (air-launched) is lighter (2.5 tons) and has a slightly shorter range (~400–500 km), optimised to be carried by the IAF’s Su-30MKI fighters – each Su-30 can carry one BrahMos-A on its belly. This combination gives the IAF a true “stand-off” strike capability: a Su-30 launching a BrahMos from, say, 300 km away can hit a target almost 800 km from the launch point. During Operation Sindoor in 2025, such air-launched missiles were indeed used for precision strikes. Indian Rafale fighters fired French-made SCALP cruise missiles, and Su-30MKIs may have employed BrahMos, to destroy terrorist camps and even Pakistani airbases, all while staying safely outside enemy air defences. This real combat use (albeit limited) showcased the deadly reach of India’s cruise missiles.
Another variant, BrahMos-NG (Next Generation), is in development – a smaller, 1.5-ton version with the same range/speed but compact enough for lighter fighters (like India’s Tejas or perhaps export customers’ aircraft). BrahMos-NG would allow fighters to carry multiple missiles (e.g. two per Su-30) instead of one, multiplying firepower. A BrahMos-ER (Extended Range) software update already allows some existing missiles to fly ~450 km, and the ultimate 800 km version likely involves some hardware and trajectory optimisations.Looking ahead, BrahMos-II is on the drawing board as a hypersonic successor. It is planned to use a scramjet engine (borrowing from Russia’s Zircon missile tech) to achieve perhaps Mach 7–8 speeds. If realised (perhaps by the late 2020s), BrahMos-II would make India one of the few nations with an operational hypersonic cruise missile, outpacing any air defence. This is a joint project with Russia as well, leveraging both countries’ research; as of 2025, it remains in development.
Indigenous Content: BrahMos started as a true joint venture – Indian guidance and software, Russian engine and seeker (derived from the P-800 Oniks/Yakhont missile). Over time, India has indigenized many components. Notably, by 2018, DRDO successfully developed its own active radar seeker for BrahMos, replacing the Russian seeker. Indian companies (like Data Patterns and others) now produce seekers and other electronics. The propulsion still uses a Russian ramjet engine, but efforts are on to develop an Indian ramjet. The airframes are produced in India (at BrahMos Aerospace’s facilities). As a result, the BrahMos today is often cited as around 65-70% indigenous by value. This percentage will rise further if an Indian engine comes on board. The joint venture nature means BrahMos benefited from Russian expertise but created a significant Indian manufacturing ecosystem – a model of co-development.
Comparisons: BrahMos is one of the fastest operational cruise missiles in the world. The typical Western analogue, the US Tomahawk cruise missile, is subsonic (~880 km/h) but has a longer reach (~1,600 km in latest versions) and a long combat pedigree (used extensively since the 1991 Gulf War). In contrast, BrahMos sacrifices range for sheer speed and penetrative power – a Mach 3 sea-skimming missile gives very little reaction time to a target (a BrahMos covering 300 km in under 10 minutes vs a Tomahawk taking nearly an hour for similar distance). Capability: Against modern warships or high-value targets, BrahMos is far harder to intercept than subsonic missiles, making it extremely lethal. It carries a smaller warhead than some heavy subsonic missiles, but its kinetic impact at high speed adds to the destructive effect. The US, noticing a gap in supersonic anti-ship missiles, is now developing such missiles (e.g. SM-6 and LRASM in anti-ship mode), while Russia has fielded the P-800 and now the hypersonic Zircon. China’s closest equivalents are the YJ-12 (supersonic, Mach 3, ~400 km range air-launched) and YJ-18 (~540 km, subsonic cruise with supersonic terminal sprint) for anti-ship roles. China also has land-attack cruise missiles (CJ-10, ~1,500 km subsonic) more akin to Tomahawk. Pakistan has developed the Babur cruise missile (subsonic, ~450 km, terrain-hugging) and Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (~350 km) with Chinese help. These Pakistani missiles are slower and easier to defend against than BrahMos, but they present a different threat, stealthier due to low speed and terrain following. In Operation Sindoor, Pakistan did launch some Babur-class missiles in retaliation, but India’s defences were able to intercept them, helped by systems like Akash and the layered shield. BrahMos, by contrast, has never been intercepted in tests, though also never faced an Iron Dome or Patriot in combat.
Cost: A BrahMos missile costs around $3–$5 million per unit, depending on variant – more expensive than a subsonic Tomahawk (~$1–$2M) or a Pakistani Babur (unknown, but likely cheaper given simpler design). However, BrahMos’s cost is justified by its speed and versatility. Importantly, countries are willing to pay for that capability: in 2022, the Philippines became the first export customer, buying a BrahMos coastal defence battery for nearly $375 million (for 3 launchers and missiles). Other countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the UAE have shown interest. For many mid-sized nations, BrahMos offers top-tier capability without the development burden – an area where India is now competing with big players. Indeed, by 2025, Indian defence exports have grown, with multiple countries inquiring about buying Indian missiles and air defence systems – a notable shift where India is becoming an arms exporter rather than just an importer.
Battle Provenness: BrahMos itself had not seen active combat until reports in 2025 that it may have been used during the Sindoor conflict for precision strikes. While details are not officially public, Indian media hinted that BrahMos units were possibly employed in the strikes on Pakistani air bases. In March 2022, a BrahMos was accidentally launched during a technical mishap and landed in Pakistan (fortunately without exploding). That incident, while embarrassing, don’t know for whom, ironically demonstrated the missile’s reliability in flight – it flew 100 km into Pakistan at low level, un-intercepted, before crashing (prompting Pakistan to lodge a protest). Apart from that, BrahMos has been test-fired over a dozen times, including from all platforms (the submarine-launched version was tested from a submerged pontoon, proving it can be deployed from subs). The consistent success of these tests has given BrahMos a formidable reputation, to the point that China and others took notice when the Philippines opted to buy BrahMos as a deterrent. In a hypothetical conflict, BrahMos missiles in Indian service would likely target enemy warships and strategic installations with high chances of success, given their speed and proven accuracy (~1 m CEP in tests). Only advanced layered defences (like a combination of long-range SAMs and close-in weapon systems) would have a hope of stopping them – and even then, not assuredly.
Nirbhay Subsonic Cruise Missile
To complement BrahMos, India has been developing Nirbhay, a subsonic all-weather cruise missile akin to the Tomahawk. Nirbhay has a range of about 1,000 km, flies low (terrain-hugging) at ~0.7 Mach, and can carry a 300 kg warhead (conventional or nuclear). Development began in the 2000s but had a series of test failures early on. By 2019–2021, DRDO had improved the design (including an indigenously developed small turbofan engine called “Manik”), and test flights were successful. Nirbhay has since been adapted into a program called ITCM (Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile) using the Indian engine. Status: As of 2025, Nirbhay/ITCM is likely near induction. Once operational, it provides India with a desi equivalent to Pakistan’s Babur or the American Tomahawk for land attack, with the advantage of being launchable from various platforms (ground, air, possibly ships). Compared to BrahMos, Nirbhay is slower but stealthier (harder to detect on radar due to low altitude flight) and much longer-ranged for deep strikes. A mix of BrahMos and Nirbhay gives Indian forces flexibility: use BrahMos for time-critical or heavily defended targets, Nirbhay for longer-range strikes where stealth and range trump speed. Comparison: The US Tomahawk remains the gold standard for subsonic cruise missiles with combat experience; Nirbhay hasn’t been combat-proven, but its design leverages similar principles. Against Chinese defences, a missile like Nirbhay would pose a challenge similar to Tomahawks, needing point defence like HQ-16 or HQ-9 SAMs or fighter interceptions. Notably, India's development of BrahMos was partly to hedge against not having a working subsonic cruise missile earlier; with Nirbhay’s successful development, India will have both types available indigenously.
Anti-Ship Missiles and Specialised Air-Launched Missiles
Beyond BrahMos (which itself is a potent anti-ship missile), India uses a variety of other anti-ship missiles. The Navy still operates some Russian Kh-35 Uran missiles (subsonic sea-skimmers, ~130 km) on older ships, and the Air Force’s Jaguars carry the French AM39 Exocet. However, these are slowly being eclipsed by BrahMos in the anti-ship role for longer ranges. The Air Force and Navy’s new focus is to integrate BrahMos on more platforms (e.g. maritime patrol aircraft P-8I might get a variant).
For air combat and SEAD (Suppress Enemy Air Defences) roles, India has made strides in indigenous missiles too: the Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile is a radar-guided missile developed by DRDO. With a range of ~100 km, Astra Mk1 was inducted around 2020 on Su-30MKI fighters, giving capability similar to the US AIM-120 AMRAAM (which Pakistan used in 2019). This is a significant indigenisation step. Previously, India relied on Russian R-77 or Israeli Derby missiles. Astra’s performance is said to be on par with contemporary BVR missiles, and an extended range Mk2 (derbying 150 km) and a ramjet-powered Mk3 (like MBDA Meteor equivalent) are in development. Comparison: The Astra hasn’t seen combat use yet (again, a good thing to avoid war), but it has been tested in live-fire exercises. When stacked against peers, the American AIM-120C-5 (used by Pakistan’s F-16s) has a slightly shorter range (~80 km) than Astra and was proven in the 2019 skirmish (it downed an Indian MiG-21). China’s PL-15 missile outranges Astra (claimed >200 km) but is unproven in battle. In terms of cost, Astra is cheaper since it’s made in India; strategically, having Astra means India is not dependent on foreign suppliers for BVR missiles anymore, an important edge if wartime resupply becomes an issue.
Another indigenous missile is the Rudram-1, an anti-radiation missile (ARM) developed to target enemy radars and air defence systems. Tested in 2020, Rudram-1 has a range of ~150 km and homes onto radar emissions. This is India’s first ARM, giving the IAF the ability to suppress enemy air defences by knocking out SAM radars from a distance. In Operation Sindoor’s opening phase, India deliberately did not pre-emptively destroy Pakistani SAM sites due to restrictive Rules of Engagement on Day 1, which led to some Indian aircraft losses. This hard lesson likely means that in the future, India will not hold back its Rudram missiles – any engagement would start with blinding the enemy’s air defences. Rudram’s induction thus significantly empowers the IAF’s offensive punch. Comparatively, ARM missiles exist with the US (AGM-88 HARM), Russia (Kh-31P), and China (FT-2000 concept), but few countries outside these have such weapons. India having Rudram is a big step towards self-sufficiency in a niche capability.
Lastly, at the tactical edge, India finally achieved success with the Nag anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). After decades of R&D, the Nag fire-and-forget ATGM (4 km range, imaging infrared seeker) was proven, and a variant called Helina (helicopter-launched Nag, range ~7-8 km) was tested from ALH Rudra gunships. These ATGMs, along with newer man-portable ATGMs developed indigenously (to avoid importing Javelins or Spikes), enhance the Army’s punch against armour. While small in scale compared to Agnis and BrahMos, they reflect the broader trend of Indian indigenous missiles at all levels – from strategic nukes to shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, making India far less import-dependent than before. By 2035, with most ATGMs, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and even smart guided bombs being made in India, the nation’s indigenisation rate in its missile arsenal will be extremely high, likely surpassed only by the US, Russia, and China.
Comparative Rating (Offensive Missiles): India’s cruise missiles (BrahMos, Nirbhay) are world-class in capability. BrahMos in particular stands among the top in its category: faster than anything the US or NATO field (they rely on subsonic but stealthy or high-flying missiles), roughly on par with the latest Russian and Chinese supersonic missiles. In cost terms, BrahMos is more expensive per round, but you may need fewer BrahMos to do the job that might require multiple subsonic hits. Its battlefield readiness was partially validated in 2025 (and through numerous tests prior). Meanwhile, Nirbhay, when deployed, will give a low-cost ($1M-class) long-range option similar to other cruise missiles globally, with presumably decent accuracy (DRDO reportedly achieved <3m CEP in tests). Pakistan’s cruise missiles lag in speed and possibly guidance tech (Babur reportedly reverse-engineered from US Tomahawk debris via China), and none of them have been used in a conflict effectively. In Sindoor, Pakistan’s attempts to use drones and missiles were “largely thwarted” by Indian defences, implying Babur strikes did not achieve much. Israel, a leader in high-tech weaponry, interestingly does not deploy a supersonic cruise missile; its doctrine favours airstrikes with precision bombs and shorter-range interceptors (like their Popeye air-launched missile). So in the cruise missile arena, India outpaces Israel and Pakistan, and is competitive with – even slightly ahead of – China in certain niches (e.g. BrahMos vs Chinese YJ missiles) while behind the US/Russia only in the hypersonic regime (which India is working to bridge with BrahMos-II and the HSTDV program). Notably, in September 2020, India successfully test-flew its Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) with a scramjet engine at Mach 5.9 for 20 seconds, making India one of just four countries (after the US, Russia, and China) to demonstrate a hypersonic cruise capability. By 2035, India will very likely have an operational hypersonic missile, keeping it in step with the great powers on this cutting-edge front.
In air-to-air missiles, India’s Astra gives it autonomy and is roughly on par with the types in service in Pakistan and China (though China’s newest PL-15 might over-range it). The Western benchmark Meteor (BVRAAM) outranges Astra and is battle-tested with European air forces, but India can eventually field its own ramjet version. Given cost considerations and strategic needs, India’s choice to develop Astra has paid off by 2025. Anti-radiation and anti-tank missiles further augment capabilities that many developing militaries lack. Countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are now looking to India as a supplier of such missiles because they see performance at a lower cost. For example, Brazil in 2025 not only talked to India about Akash SAMs but also the Garuda 105mm mobile artillery – and it wouldn’t be surprising if BrahMos or Astra are on some countries’ wishlists too, as India’s defence exports bloom.
Air Defence Systems – Shielding the Sky
If missiles are the spear, air defence (AD) is the shield. India’s air defence network circa 2025 is a layered quilt of systems, old and new, woven together into an increasingly integrated air defence system (IADS). Its aim: to protect Indian airspace from everything from fighters and bombers to drones, cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles. In Operation Sindoor, this air defence shield was put to the test – and performed impressively, creating an “impenetrable shield” against incoming Pakistani drones and missiles. Let’s break down India’s AD arsenal and how it’s being upgraded.
Integrated Network & Sensors
The backbone of India’s AD is not just missiles, but the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) – an automated network that fuses data from dozens of military and civilian radars, satellite feeds, and observer reports into one common operating picture. Developed by Bharat Electronics Limited, IACCS allows commanders to see everything in the sky in real time and coordinate responses swiftly. This proved crucial during Sindoor, when more than 2 dozen IAF officers sat in the IACCS control room watching a consolidated feed of the air battle and vectored interceptors and SAMs to every threat. Likewise, the Indian Army fields a parallel system called Akashteer for low-level air defence control, linking Army AD units and radars on a single grid. Akashteer, an all-Indian system inducted in 2023, came of age in Sindoor: it enabled Army anti-air units to detect and destroy every single enemy drone with a 100% kill rate. This kind of seamless integration – similar to advanced NATO systems – is what makes the difference between disparate missile batteries and a true “shield”.
India maintains a wide array of radars: from long-range surveillance radars like the Israeli EL/M-2080 Green Pine (used for ballistic missile detection and part of the Arrow system Israel built) and indigenous Swordfish radar (an evolved variant of Green Pine) for BMD, to medium and low-level 3D radars like Indra, Rohini, Arudhra, etc. These radars feed into IACCS. The Air Force also operates AWACS (Phalcon and indigenous Netra AEW&C) for aerial surveillance. During Sindoor, India’s radars gave early warning of Pakistani retaliatory strikes, and the command networks ensured short reaction times to vector air defence assets.
Now to the actual weapons of air defence, which can be understood in layers by range/altitude:
Long-Range Air Defence (Strategic SAMs)
In 2018, India made a major purchase: the Russian S-400 Triumf system. Five S-400 squadrons were contracted (approx $5.5 billion) and deliveries began in late 2021; by 2025, India has deployed several S-400 units covering key regions (likely one near Delhi, one in the western sector, etc.). The S-400 is a world-class long-range SAM, with a mix of missile types that can engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and even ballistic missiles at ranges up to 400 km (with 40N6 missile) for surveillance aircraft, ~250 km for fighter-sized targets, and ~30 km for ballistic targets. In Operation Sindoor, the S-400, “imported from Russia, to Washington’s great consternation,” proved exceptionally effective as part of India’s layered air defence. While details are scant, it likely detected and deterred Pakistani air incursions (Pakistani J-10 fighters did not venture deep once they knew S-400s were active) and may have shot down enemy missiles. Analysts have compared the Indian S-400’s presence to placing a bubble over parts of Indian airspace that Pakistan’s ageing fighters and incoming weapons struggled to penetrate.
Comparison: The S-400 is often compared to the US Patriot and THAAD systems, and to China’s HQ-9 (which is essentially a Chinese clone of the earlier S-300). In capability, S-400 is more versatile than Patriot. It covers higher and farther ranges and can target more types (Patriot PAC-3, for instance, is optimised for ballistic missiles in terminal phase but has a shorter reach against aircraft ~100 km). The US THAAD is specialised for high-altitude intercepts of ballistic missiles (no use against aircraft). Israel’s long-range system, Arrow-2/3, is purely anti-ballistic. So, S-400 is unique in its multi-role long-range envelope.
Cost: S-400 is cheaper than equivalent Western systems (which is partly why India bought it despite US objections), yet still pricey per unit. But given it can shield huge areas (one system can cover a city like Delhi), the cost per defended asset is justified.
Provenness: The S-400 itself had not been used in a hot war until possibly the 2022 Ukraine conflict – there, Russian S-400s reportedly have shot down some Ukrainian aircraft and missiles, though details are murky. S-300, its predecessor, has a long track record (and ironically has been used by both Ukraine and Russia in that war – Ukraine for air defence, Russia even repurposed some S-300 to strike ground targets when running low on other missiles!). Patriot has seen extensive use in the Middle East intercepting Iraqi Scuds (with mixed success historically, though improved now) and Yemeni Houthi missiles (Saudi-operated Patriots have intercepted several missiles and drones). In the 2019 Abqaiq attack, Saudi Patriots failed to stop low-flying cruise missiles/drone swarms – underlining that no single system is foolproof. In Sindoor, however, the combination of Indian S-400 and other layers did stop all threats, from ballistic missiles to swarms of drones, achieving what one Indian officer called “every threat was detected, every target destroyed”. That is a remarkable performance – essentially battle-proofing India’s IADS concept in live conflict.
Beyond S-400, India is also developing an indigenous long-range SAM known in the media as XR-SAM (eXtra-long Range SAM). This project aims to fill the gap between the 70-km range MR-SAM and the 400-km S-400, likely with a range of ~250 km. XR-SAM is reportedly under development by DRDO and could become a reality by the late 2020s, giving India a wholly indigenous long-range shield (so it doesn’t need to buy more S-400s or the new S-500). There were reports of XR-SAM tests planned by 2024, and it may have anti-ballistic capabilities as well. If successful, XR-SAM will put India alongside the US, Russia, and China in having an indigenous long-range SAM system.
Medium-Range SAMs (MR-SAM and Akash)
At the medium layer (up to ~70 km), India has two primary systems:
Barak-8 / MR-SAM: Co-developed with Israel, the Barak-8 (also called MR-SAM for Medium Range SAM in IAF service, and LRSAM in naval service) is a modern 70 km-range air defence missile with active radar homing. It can intercept fighters, UAVs, and sea-skimming missiles. The Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy all deploy versions of it. For example, Indian naval destroyers carry Barak-8 to shoot down incoming sea-skimmers and aircraft (this was a leap from older Barak-1, which was only point-defence). On land, the IAF has Barak-8 batteries protecting critical areas and assets (like airbases, industrial zones). Barak-8’s performance is considered excellent – it’s known for high agility and a two-way datalink enabling mid-course updates. It’s very similar in class to the latest US NASAMS or the European Aster-30.
Battle-provenness: Israel has reportedly used its Barak (known as MRSAM in Indian service) from naval vessels to intercept a Syrian missile once, and perhaps against drones. In Indian service, during Sindoor, the Barak-8 units were active, though specific kills aren’t public. Given that not a single Pakistani manned aircraft managed to penetrate Indian airspace in that conflict, one can infer that systems like Barak-8 and Akash deterred or shot them down near the border. Notably, Pakistan did not send piloted strikes deep into India after the initial skirmishes, likely fearing the dense SAM cover.
Comparison: Barak-8 is on par with Western SAMs in effectiveness, and more advanced than anything Pakistan has (Pakistan’s longest-range SAM currently is HQ-9/P from China with ~125 km range, only recently acquired and not as combat-tested as Barak-8). China’s HQ-16 (~40 km, analogue of older Russian Buk) and HQ-9 (S-300 clone) are deployed by Pakistan, but in Sindoor, the IAF still succeeded in striking Pakistani bases protected by those Chinese SAMs. This suggests either that those SAMs were suppressed or evaded, or possibly even destroyed by Indian anti-radiation attacks, reaffirming the quality of India’s SEAD and the advantage of having systems like Barak-8 integrated with better radar coverage.
Cost: The MR-SAM isn’t cheap (the India-Israel deal for several squadrons was in the billions), but it’s produced in India (Bharat Dynamics Ltd manufactures many components), bringing unit costs down and involving Indian industry.
Akash Prime, equipped with an indigenous Radio Frequency seeker for improved accuracy Akash SAM: The Akash is India’s indigenous medium-range SAM (25–30 km range in Mk1 version). Developed under IGMDP, it overcame many hurdles and was finally inducted in 2015. Akash uses a unique ramjet propulsion (much like a smaller SA-6 Gainful concept) and has a large kill zone against fighters, drones, and missiles. It is guided by an indigenous Rajendra phased-array radar. During Operation Sindoor, Akash batteries were “prominently deployed” and successfully countered multiple aerial threats. Interest from countries like Belarus, Malaysia, Vietnam, and lately Brazil in the Akash system spiked after seeing its performance. The Akash is a highly indigenous, cost-effective SAM: each missile costs a fraction of an imported one, and the system can be mobilised with relatively simple logistics (truck-mounted launchers, etc.). Its limitation is range (~30 km) and its older guidance (it’s not an active seeker missile; it uses command guidance via radar till terminal phase, semi-active homing concept). But ongoing improvements are significant: an Akash-1S variant added an indigenous seeker for better terminal accuracy, tested in 2019. More importantly, DRDO has developed Akash-NG (New Generation) – a totally new missile with canister launch, active radar seeker, and a range of ~70 km. Akash-NG was successfully test-fired in 2021 and 2022, intercepting high-speed targets, and as of January 2024, had completed high-altitude intercept trials. Induction is expected soon. With Akash-NG, India will have a fully indigenous counterpart to Barak-8, creating redundancy and enabling exports (since some nations that can’t buy Israeli missiles for political reasons could buy Akash-NG).
Battle-provenness: The 2025 conflict was the first real test for Akash in combat. According to Indian Army accounts, Akash batteries were responsible for shooting down several hostile aircraft or drones. For example, one of Pakistan’s Chinese-made armed drones was shot down by an Akash missile when it attempted to breach Indian airspace. By all accounts, Akash acquitted itself well, and its reliability and quick reaction (ready-to-fire in <5 minutes from march) impressed observers.
Comparison: Versus Pakistan’s medium SAM (LY-80/HQ-16, 40 km range), Akash is shorter-range but has comparable altitude coverage and is more mobile. Pakistan has no indigenous SAM like Akash; it relies on Chinese imports. Versus modern Western SAMs, Akash Mk1 is less sophisticated (no active seeker, shorter range), but Akash-NG will narrow that gap significantly. The Indian Army is also deploying Akash in large numbers to protect forward troops and critical areas – it serves a similar role to what the Soviet Kvadrat/SA-6 did for India in the past, but with updated tech and made-in-India supply.
Short-Range and Point Defence
Closer to the frontlines and sensitive installations, India deploys short-range SAMs and anti-aircraft guns to handle targets that slip through or pop up close.
QRSAM (Quick Reaction SAM): This is a new DRDO-developed system in final testing, meant to protect moving armoured columns and forward bases from sudden air threats. QRSAM has a range of ~25–30 km, is truck-mounted, and features 360° coverage with an active seeker missile. It can engage fighter jets or drones at low altitude. Tests in 2021–22 demonstrated intercepts of low-flying targets and high-speed targets with 100% success. It is expected to replace older Russian systems like OSA-AK (SA-8) and complement Akash for Army air defence. With its shoot-and-scoot mobility and quick reaction time (detect to launch in seconds), QRSAM adds a layer particularly useful against low-flying cruise missiles or drones. By 2025, limited production may have started; full induction is likely by 2026. When in service, QRSAM will compare favorably to systems like the Pakistani Crotale or Chinese LD-2000 – in fact, Pakistan currently lacks a modern QRSAM; it has relied on dated crotales and some Chinese FM-90 (improved HQ-7) for short range, which are arguably inferior to QRSAM’s modern sensors and range.
Spyder SR/MR: To quickly bolster short-range coverage, the IAF bought a few units of the Israeli Spyder system in the late 2000s. Spyder uses Python-5 and Derby air-to-air missiles adapted as SAMs, with ranges of 15 km (SR) to 35 km (ER). These have been deployed around some high-value areas and were also active during Sindoor. Their quick-reaction nature helped plug gaps – for example, when Pakistan launched salvos of small drones and loitering munitions, Spyder units near the border reportedly shot down a number of them. Spyder is basically a gap-filler until QRSAM and Akash-NG take over; it’s battle-proven in other contexts (Azerbaijan used it in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war successfully, and Israel uses Spyder tech for point defence at times). For India, Spyder adds an extra layer, especially against very low flying targets that Akash’s radar might miss under clutter.
Man-Portable SAMs (VSHORAD): The last line of defence is shoulder-fired missiles and close-in guns. India has recently acquired new Igla-S MANPADS from Russia (a contract for a large number of Igla-S was signed in 2018, deliveries by mid-2020s). Igla-S (SA-24) is a modern IR-homing missile effective to ~5 km range, used to equip Army air defence platoons and Air Force base defence units. These would be used against enemy helicopters, low-flying attack aircraft, or even incoming missiles in a desperate last-ditch effort (though MANPADS’ success against cruise missiles or drones can be hit-or-miss). In Sindoor, there were anecdotal accounts of Indian soldiers using Igla to take down a slow-moving surveillance drone. Additionally, India is developing its own VSHORAD missile (DRDO has a man-portable SAM project with an IR seeker), tested in 2022, to eventually replace Igla and Strela systems. By 2035, India might have fully indigenous MANPADS too.
Anti-Aircraft Guns and CIWS: India still employs gun systems like the upgraded L/70 40mm and ZU-23-2B guns for point defence. These are radar-directed and effective against slow targets within 3-4 km. The Army recently contracted for new-generation air defence gun systems – the competition saw entries like the Korean Hybrid Biho and others. The likely outcome is an Indian private industry-led solution with foreign collaboration to deliver modern 30mm guns with fire control radars and integrated missile launchers. These will replace 1980s-era Shilka and older guns in the late 2020s. On warships, the Navy has Barak-1 CIWS missiles and Russian AK-630 Gatling guns to handle sea-skimming threats as a last resort; on land, similar guns could be used to pepper the sky if missiles fail. During the Pakistan drone onslaught in Sindoor (where waves of small kamikaze drones were used), it was actually a combination of systems that stopped them: SAMs took some, jammers and EW took some, and close-in guns likely downed the rest. In fact, Akashteer automated the handing off of targets to the closest “Shooter” – sometimes that shooter was an anti-aircraft gun that opened up to splatter a drone. The result was spectacular: not one of the dozens of hostile drones got through to hit its target. That 100% defence rate is almost unheard of in modern warfare (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s layered defence struggled against drone swarms). It speaks to how well-prepared and integrated the Indian AD was in real operations.
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
Perhaps the most technologically challenging element of air defence is intercepting ballistic missiles – essentially hitting a bullet with a bullet at extreme altitude and speed. India is one of only a handful of countries that have developed a working BMD system. The programme has been in the works since the early 2000s. By 2018, India had demonstrated endo-atmospheric intercepts (within the atmosphere, low altitude) with its AAD (Advanced Air Defence) interceptor and exo-atmospheric intercepts (in space, high altitude) with the PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) interceptor. These were part of BMD Phase-1, intended to tackle enemy missiles of range up to ~2,000 km (i.e. primarily Pakistani MRBMs). In fact, Delhi and Mumbai were earmarked to get the first operational double-layer BMD protection using these interceptors. While details are classified, it’s believed that some elements of this BMD were quietly deployed around 2017 for Delhi.
Sindoor did not escalate to Pakistan firing ballistic missiles at Indian cities (Pakistan’s ballistic arsenal was held back, perhaps because once those fly, India might respond on nuclear logic). However, the crisis spurred India to accelerate its Phase-2 BMD development to defend against even intermediate-range missiles and potentially the kind China could loft.
AD-1 and AD-2 Interceptors: Phase-2 envisages two new interceptors – AD-1 for endo-atmospheric high-altitude intercepts and AD-2 for exo-atmospheric (outside the atmosphere) intercepts. The AD-1 is essentially a long-range, dual-role interceptor that can take out ballistic missiles during mid-course or terminal phase, as well as act as a long-range SAM against aircraft. With a two-stage solid motor, AD-1 has a large kill envelope spanning both low-endo-atmospheric (within 30 km altitude) and low-exo-atmospheric (just outside the atmosphere) engagements. It was first flight-tested in Nov 2022, successfully intercepting a target missile. By March 2025, DRDO had enough confidence to start limited production of AD-1 for expanded trials, a clear indicator that they intend to deploy it soon. Experts have equated AD-1’s capability to the US THAAD (which intercepts intermediate-range missiles in endo/exo at ~150 km altitude). AD-1, with its advanced seeker, guidance and agility, is a major leap – it can handle threats beyond 2,000 km range, potentially up to 5,000 km class. It also doubles as a very long-range SAM (think of it like a desi S-400 missile) for aircraft at 200+ km range. AD-2, still in development, will be a heavier, faster interceptor for high exo-atmospheric kills – essentially targeting missiles in the 5,000+ km ICBM class in mid-course, akin to the US Ground-Based Interceptor or Russia’s new A-235 system. AD-2 hasn’t been publicised as much; a test of “Phase-2 exo interceptor” was reportedly done in late 2023 or 2024. By the mid-2020s, these programs will be advancing well. In July 2024, DRDO conducted a complex test of Phase-2 BMD where an endo interceptor hit a target in a “textbook precision”, and insiders noted it achieved all objectives in a realistic scenario.
Operational Scenario: When India’s BMD network is fully ready (say by early 2030s), it will involve overlapping radar coverage (including the Swordfish long-range radars upgraded to track 5000 km targets), satellite early warning support (India may launch dedicated early warning satellites or leverage allies’ data by then), and a three-tier kill system: exo-atmospheric kill by AD-2 in space, high-endo/low-exo kill by AD-1, and finally the end-game kill by AAD (now improved) in atmosphere. This is similar to Israel’s multi-tier Arrow-3/Arrow-2/Iron Dome concept or the US layered BMD (Aegis/THAAD/Patriot). How effective could this be? Let’s consider a nuclear missile fired at India by an adversary. If Pakistan launched, it’d likely be a medium-range ballistic missile (like a Shaheen-II or III) carrying a single warhead. India’s Phase-1/2 BMD is designed exactly for that threat. Even with a modest success probability per interceptor (say 70%), India would fire multiple interceptors (shoot-shoot-look-shoot tactics) to ensure a high kill probability. The chances of a single Pakistani nuke getting through, once the full system is active, could be quite low – perhaps well under 10-20% (and that assumes Pakistan fires only one or two – in a larger salvo India’s system might get saturated, but Pakistan’s arsenal is limited anyway). With space-based cueing and multiple engagement opportunities (exo and endo), India could very plausibly intercept an incoming warhead. Against a Chinese missile (which could be faster, maybe even a lofted ICBM), Phase-2 would be tested to its limits – the probability of intercept might drop, but still India would have some chance, especially if it covers key targets. By 2035, if Phase-3 BMD (which contemplates AD-3 or advanced interceptors for hypersonic glide vehicles comes to fruition, India might even counter limited ICBMs or manoeuvring warheads. However, no BMD is foolproof if faced with massive volleys or sophisticated decoys; that’s why India doesn’t bank on BMD alone, it relies on deterrence to dissuade attacks in the first place.
Deterrence vs Defence
Indeed, the surest way to stop a nuclear missile attack is to convince the enemy never to launch one. India’s policy of assured massive retaliation and its burgeoning submarine-based nuclear fleet make the cost of any nuke strike impossibly high for the initiator. This is why no country is likely to ever fire a nuclear weapon at India. Even at the height of Operation Sindoor – a conflict that saw air strikes and heavy exchanges – both India and Pakistan scrupulously avoided nuclear sabre-rattling. Neither side even moved nuclear forces overtly, a far cry from earlier crises when threats were more explicit. This restraint was partly because India’s calibrated response (conventional only, striking terror infrastructure) avoided cornering Pakistan’s state, but also because Pakistan understood a nuclear move would be suicidal. India’s nuclear submarines lurking underwater ensure that even if land and air forces are hit, a second strike will annihilate the aggressor’s cities and military targets. As of 2025, India has two SSBNs operational (with a third to join soon) and plans for four by the end of the decade. Each carries nuclear-tipped SLBMs. Even one Arihant-class sub, with 4 K-4 missiles (3,500 km range, 2-3 warheads each), could deliver enough nuclear firepower to wipe out several major cities. And India plans to build bigger subs carrying more missiles in the 2030s. This sea-based deterrent is a silent, final layer of defence, not by shooting down an incoming nuke, but by guaranteeing mutual destruction, thereby preventing the launch in the first place.
Emerging Directed-Energy Weapons (DEW)
Beyond missiles and guns, India is eyeing futuristic directed energy systems (lasers and high-power microwaves) for air defence. DRDO has several DEW projects: one known public project is DURGA II (Directionally Unrestricted Ray Gun Array), a 100-kilowatt laser weapon in development. In 2024, DRDO sought $100 million in funding to accelerate this high-power laser program. The goal is to mount DEWs on vehicles to neutralise drones, missiles, and artillery shells at the speed of light. A 100 kW laser, if achieved, could fry sensors or burn through thin-skinned targets (like UAVs or incoming rocket/artillery rounds) within a few kilometres of range almost instantly.
Advantages: DEWs offer virtually infinite ammo (just power supply), and engagement at light-speed with pinpoint precision and minimal collateral damage. They are seen as the answer to swarm attacks and even a counter to hypersonic missiles in the future, since a focused laser could, in theory, heat a hypersonic vehicle to destruction if tracked precisely.
Indian progress: DRDO has already developed lower-powered lasers. In 2020, a DRDO 10 kW laser was tested to bring down drones at short range. In 2022, an Indian 30 kW directed-energy system successfully neutralised targets 5 km away, placing India among a small elite in laser weaponry. The plan is to scale to 100 kW (DURGA-II) by the late 2020s, which would make it a practical weapon against faster targets. There’s also mention of radio-frequency DEWs (microwave weapons) to fry the electronics of drones/missiles. These were likely employed in a limited way already: during Sindoor, in addition to kinetic kills, India used electronic warfare extensively – jamming and spoofing many of Pakistan’s drones, causing some to crash without a shot fired. In one instance, an Indian EW unit took over a small drone’s link and forced it to land harmlessly. These soft-kill methods will only grow with better directed energy tech.
By 2035, India envisions laser-based air defence batteries to complement missile batteries. For example, a high-power laser on a truck could protect a military base by silently zapping incoming mini-drones or even mortar rounds, saving expensive missiles for bigger threats. Many countries are racing in this domain: the US, Israel, Russia, and China all have DEW programs (Israel’s Iron Beam laser is nearing deployment for short-range rocket defence). India, with DURGA-II, doesn’t want to be left behind. If successful, India could field one of the first operational laser AD systems in Asia, which again enhances indigenous capability (since buying such tech from abroad is unlikely due to secrecy around DEWs).
Operation Sindoor – Triumph of India’s Air Defence
The May 2025 conflict offered a window into how all these layers came together. Pakistan’s counter-offensive “Operation Bunyan Marsoos” involved volleys of Chinese-made Wing Loong armed drones, Turkish kamikaze drones, and even a handful of NASR rockets and Babur cruise missiles. They threw everything to overwhelm Indian defences. But India’s response was a “Triumphant Shield” (as one newspaper called it): the IAF scrambled Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 fighters to intercept some threats, the Akash and Spyder SAMs took out others, and close-in systems mopped up the rest. The new Akashteer C3I played the most crucial role, automating target allocation so that within seconds of a detection, the nearest gun or missile system was engaging the target. As a result, India shot down every single hostile aerial object over the 4-day conflict. This perfect record astonished observers – even allies like the US quietly acknowledged that India’s homemade network worked flawlessly where many advanced militaries have been caught off-guard by drone swarms. Key systems that proved themselves include:
Akash SAM: destroyed multiple drones/missiles, showing high reliability.
S-400 and Barak-8: provided wide-area cover, likely deterring Pakistan from using its manned air force effectively after Day 1. (Pakistani JF-17 and J-10 sorties stayed mostly on their side of the border after initial skirmishes, as Indian SAMs created no-fly zones).
Fighter intercepts: The IAF also leveraged its air superiority – on the first night, IAF MiG-29s and Su-30s flying combat air patrols picked off a couple of Pakistani cruise missiles and drones using Astra missiles and guns, demonstrating a tight integration between air and ground defences.
IACCS/Akashteer: These unsung heroes ensured there were no blue-on-blue incidents (with so many weapons firing, it’s easy to have fratricide – but having a consolidated picture prevented that) and optimised resource use (no redundant firing at the same target).
By the conflict’s end, India had neutralised Pakistan’s air assault while preserving its defensive umbrella. Not a single Pakistani weapon struck a strategic Indian target in any meaningful way. In contrast, India’s offensive strikes devastated about 20% of Pakistan’s air force infrastructure and took down several combat aircraft on the ground and in the air. This lopsided outcome drove home how much India’s capabilities had grown relative to its neighbour. It also validated years of investment in indigenous systems. Post-Sindoor, Indian officials noted a change in stance: previously, India hesitated to use force owing to fear of escalation or gaps in readiness. After Sindoor, with a confident shield and sword, India’s posture is more assertive yet measured – it showed it can conduct precision strikes and blunt retaliation, thus it will not shy from responding to aggression in the future (unlike pre-2016 when terror attacks often went unanswered militarily). Strategically, India also learned to shape the narrative better after initial missteps: the government realised it must quickly showcase its success (like wreckage of enemy drones, etc.) to counter adversary propaganda. The lesson is that effective defence is not just about interception but also about information.
The Road to 2035: Future-Proofing India’s Defence
Looking ahead a decade from 2025 to 2035, where will India’s missile and air defence arsenal stand? In many respects, it will be a mature version of what we see now, with key augmentations:
Higher Range & Hypersonics: By 2035, the Agni-VI (or an Agni-V “MIRV version”) is likely to be operational, giving India a true ICBM with multiple warheads. The ranges of some Agni missiles may also be extended quietly (Agni-V could be tested to 7,000+ km if needed, though politically India may not brandish that). Hypersonic weapons will join the arsenal – BrahMos-II might be in service, providing India a Mach 7 cruise missile for rapid long-distance strikes. Also, an indigenous hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) could be tested, riding on an Agni booster, to create a weapon that can evade BMD systems (since China and Russia have gone that route, India may not want to be left behind). With the HSTDV groundwork laid, an operational hypersonic missile by the 2030s is plausible. This means in 2035, India will have a mix of subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic missiles – a triad of speeds to penetrate any defence.
Fully Layered BMD: We can expect that the Phase-2 BMD would be deployed protecting not just Delhi and Mumbai, but possibly other metros or strategic sites (e.g. Chennai, Bangalore, nuclear facilities, etc.). Additionally, if Phase-3 (to counter ICBMs and hypersonics) is successful, India might incorporate those interceptors too. Essentially, a nuclear missile attack on India in 2035 would face multiple shots from multiple layers, making the odds of a successful strike even slimmer. There is even speculation that India could integrate its BMD with friendly networks (e.g. early warning data sharing with the US or Quad allies) by then, further improving reaction time.
More Nuclear Submarines: By 2035, all four planned Arihant-class subs should be in commission, each carrying K-4 or improved missiles. Moreover, the first of the S5 class SSBNs might be launched with K-5/K-6 MIRVed SLBMs. India also plans 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) – these won’t carry nukes but will escort SSBNs and hunt enemy ships/subs. Those SSNs are expected in the 2030s as well, greatly boosting India’s overall naval power and protecting the second-strike force. With perhaps 6-8 nuclear subs in total by 2035, India will firmly join the ranks of major navies, and the deterrence patrols will be more continuous and secure. This again raises the bar for any adversary contemplating aggression.
Fifth-Gen and Future Aircraft with Indigenous Weapons: India’s Air Force in 2035 should induct the indigenous AMCA stealth fighter (fifth-generation). These will carry Indian weaponry like Astra Mk3 and new standoff missiles. A project for a very long-range air-to-air missile (possibly a ramjet or ALBM for 300 km to target AWACS) might come to fruition. The Air Force will be a more stealthy, high-tech force, which complements ground-based defence. Also, expect more advanced drones (perhaps combat drones with missiles like Helina) to take up some roles.
Advanced SAMs and DEWs: On ground, Akash-NG and QRSAM will be staple systems, phasing out older imports. Perhaps an Akash-XL (a further extended range version) or XR-SAM will be in place, meaning nearly every component of India’s air defence can be indigenous. S-400 will still be around, but India might not need to import S-500 due to its own solutions. Directed energy weapons could be deployed in limited numbers – for instance, a few Air Force bases might have a laser battery for drone defence. If DURGA-II succeeds, production models (say on trucks or rail cars) might be stationed around high-value targets, zapping UAVs or providing an added layer against PGMs. This will be a game-changer because it lowers the cost-per-shot drastically for certain threats (instead of firing a $1 million missile at a $10k drone, a laser shot costing a few dollars of electricity can do the job).
Space and Atmo-Space Capabilities: India will likely integrate space more deeply, possibly having dedicated early warning satellites (infrared sensors to detect launches). After the 2019 ASAT test (Mission Shakti), where India shot down a satellite in orbit, India formed a Defence Space Agency. By 2035, they could field co-orbital satellite defence systems or at least robust space situational awareness. While India officially opposes space weaponisation, the reality is that it will protect its space assets if needed. That means any adversary’s spy satellites or incoming weapons (like a fractional orbital bombardment) could be on India’s target list if things escalate. Essentially, the IADS by 2035 might extend to outer space as well, with the ability to knock out hostile satellites or intercept threats in space. This full-spectrum capability – ground, air, space is something only the top 3-4 militaries have now, but India is on course to join them.
Indigenisation & Exports: A striking aspect of 2035 will be how Indian India’s arsenal would have become. From near-zero indigenous systems in 1947, India will have ~80-90% of its missiles and AD equipment designed or built at home. The reliance on imports will diminish to a few niche areas (perhaps heavy transport aircraft or certain high-end jet engines – areas where partnerships might still be needed). In missile/AD, India should be largely self-reliant. This not only saves cost and ensures supplies during conflict, but also opens a huge avenue for defence exports. We are already seeing the start: the world is taking notice of India’s homegrown systems. Philippines buying BrahMos, inquiries for Akash and artillery from countries in Asia/Africa, even talk of exporting the Astra missile or HAL’s anti-ship missiles to friendly nations. By the late 2020s and 2030s, Indian-made defence tech will be a fixture at global arms expos, competing with US, Russian, Chinese, and Israeli kit. India could become one of the top arms exporters, maybe not rivalling the US/Russia in volume by 2035, but possibly among the top 4 or 5. The government’s push for “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) in defence is yielding fruit, and by 2047 (India’s centenary), the vision is to have one of the highest indigenisation rates globally and a robust defence-industrial base second only to the established giants. Considering how far India has come quietly, this is quite plausible.
Behaviour and Doctrine: Post-Sindoor, India’s confidence in its military options is higher. It has shown it can conduct “calibrated force” – controlled, precise military operations without triggering all-out war. Going forward, India is likely to adopt a more proactive defence posture. This includes offensive defence measures: striking terror threats across borders, foiling enemy moves pre-emptively (like possibly shooting down hostile drones the moment they take off from enemy territory if they pose an imminent threat), and leveraging its improved surveillance to dominate the information domain. Diplomatically too, India post-Sindoor garnered support – major powers intervened to press Pakistan to back down, and there was virtually no criticism of India’s actions internationally (because India kept its aims limited and justified). This success means that in future crises, India has that precedent to build on; it will not sit idly if provoked, and it has the means to handle escalation. Also, India will invest heavily in cyber and electronic warfare, learning from modern conflicts (like Russia-Ukraine) that these are integral. One should expect Indian cyber units and EW teams to be able to, for instance, disable enemy air defence networks or blind their radars when needed. The synergy of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare is already being practised.
In essence, by 2035, the balance of power in India’s favour will be even more pronounced vis-à-vis Pakistan, and India will be a genuine peer competitor to China in many domains of missiles and AD. It might still lag China in quantity (China’s huge production might mean they have more missiles or batteries), but qualitatively, India will be in the same league. Compared to where India started – with Nehru’s dismissal of the need for a defence plan – this turnaround is dramatic.
A New Arsenal, Largely Unnoticed by Many
One of the intriguing aspects of India’s military rise is how quietly it has happened. Outside specialist circles, few have noticed that India has methodically checked virtually every box of a modern military power’s wish list: nuclear triad, BMD, precision strike weapons, network-centric warfare, and now hypersonics, indigenous 5th generation fighter and DEWs on the horizon. India did this while maintaining a defensive strategic stance (no aggressive expansionism, just deterrence) and often under the radar of the kind of scrutiny that, say, Iran or North Korea’s missile programs attract. This was possible due to India’s responsible international posture and gradual, credible development approach.
But the world is starting to take note now, especially after instances like Operation Sindoor and India’s defence export forays. Defence experts are realising that India today fields capabilities only a notch or two below the superpowers. In some areas, like supersonic cruise missiles and electronic warfare against drones, India is arguably a world leader. The fact that multiple countries are knocking on India’s door to buy systems like Akash and BrahMos is a testament to the performance and cost-effectiveness of Indian defence tech. Many experts had underestimated India, focusing instead on the US, Russia, China, and Israel as the primary sources of cutting-edge systems. India’s name is now being added to that list as a country that not only developed for itself but can also supply others.
For instance, after Sindoor, Brazil openly showed interest in acquiring the Akash missile system for its own air force. Southeast Asian nations eye BrahMos to deter powerful navies in their region. Even Middle Eastern and African nations have started sending delegations to Indian defence expos – a domain once dominated by US/Russian arms fairs. This emerging export success dovetails with India’s geopolitical aspirations of being a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and a pillar of stability.
It’s noteworthy that India achieved such indigenous success partly out of necessity – technology denial regimes in the 80s/90s forced India to innovate internally. Those sanctions were a “blessing in disguise”, as they spurred autonomy. Dr. Kalam once quipped that had the West given India advanced missiles, the country might never have developed its own. By doing it the hard way, India ended up mastering the tech.
Key figures played pivotal roles in this journey: Dr. Kalam, the visionary behind IGMDP; Dr. V.S. Arunachalam and Dr. Satish Dhawan who bridged military and space research; political leaders like Indira Gandhi who gave the initial go-ahead, A.B. Vajpayee who backed the nuclear tests and Agni developments despite international pressure, Manmohan Singh who approved big-ticket defences like Arihant sub in secrecy, and Narendra Modi who in recent years pushed indigenization and didn’t hesitate to use military force when provoked. The armed forces too adapted – the IAF and Army, once mostly users of foreign hardware, enthusiastically embraced Indian-made Akash and Astra missiles, giving valuable feedback to improve them. It’s been a national effort culminating in the prowess we see today.
In conclusion, India’s missile and air defence arsenal in 2025 is comprehensive and modern, and by 2035, it will be among the most advanced and self-reliant in the world. From having virtually no missiles 50 years ago, India now can strike targets 5,000 km away and intercept enemy missiles in space. Its multi-layer air defence can protect against the full spectrum of aerial threats, as vividly demonstrated in Operation Sindoor, where not even a swarm of drones or volley of missiles could penetrate. In the company of the US, Russia, China (and to an extent Israel), India has joined the elite club of nations that can both spear and shield with indigenous technology. This makes India’s defence posture credibly strong – strong enough that adversaries know war would be costly, and strong enough that India can hold its own in any alliance or confrontation.
The journey from Nehru’s “ahimsa” idealism to today’s robust strategic deterrent has been long and arduous, but it has made India far more secure. As the country approaches its 100th year of independence in 2047, it is poised to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the traditional military powers, not as an importer of security but as an exporter of security, stability, and cutting-edge defence solutions. And perhaps the greatest achievement is that India did so without losing its restraint or defensive ethos: it built a sword and shield so strong that it hopefully never has to use them in full-fledged war. The silent growth of India’s capabilities – largely unnoticed by those not paying attention – might well be one of the biggest shifts in global defence balance in the early 21st century. In the years to come, more of the world will indeed take notice that India has arrived as a missile power and an air defence leader, a fact already evident to those who watched the skies during Operation Sindoor.